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I. INTRODUCTION

When, after having breakfast and getting the children dressed for school,
your spouse announces to you "Honey, I'm heading off to work," how quickly
should you hand over the car keys? Recent holdings from the United States
Supreme Court suggest that reliance on the traditional values of trust and faith
in family members might be imprudent.' The safer course for a property

* Assistant Professor, California State University Fullerton, Division of Political Science and
Criminal Justice; Former Deputy District Attorney, Los Angeles, California; B.A. 1983,
University of California Los Angeles; J.D. Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, California.
1. See Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 1000 (1996) ("In any event .... forfeiture also
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owner would be to exercise "greater care in transferring possession. "2 What
"greater care" could people exercise when allowing their mates to use jointly
owned property? Perhaps interviewing mutual friends, occasionally tailing
one's spouse to and from work, or periodically hiring a private investigator
would suffice. Without some measure of marital policing, an innocent
husband or wife could find one of the family's cars suddenly forfeited to the
state through a civil in rem proceeding. 3
Such a fate befell Tina B. Bennis. Without her knowledge, Tina's
husband, John Bennis, took the family Pontiac on a detour from his usual ride
home from work.' Detroit vice officers caught Mr. Bennis performing an
indecent act with a prostitute in the car and arrested him.' As a consequence,
a Michigan court ordered the Pontiac forfeited; the order effected a capture of
Tina's interest in the vehicle. The United States Supreme Court upheld the
forfeiture.'
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, held that
Michigan's seizure of Tina's interest in the Pontiac did not violate her rights
under either the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 7 or the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment Thus, the Constitution offered no
protection against the confiscation despite Tina Bennis's complete lack of
involvement in and lack of knowledge about her husband's act of gross
indecency.9
The Bennis Court based its holding on a "long and unbroken line of
cases" stretching back to a nineteenth-century admiralty decision involving

serves a deterrent purpose distinct from any punitive purpose. Forfeiture of property prevents
illegal uses 'both by preventing further illicit use of the [property] and by imposing an economic
penalty, thereby rendering illegal behavior unprofitable.'") (alteration in original) (quoting
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 687-88 (1974)); see also CaleroToledo, 416 U.S. at 687-88 ("To the extent that such forfeiture provisions are applied to lessors,
bailors, or secured creditors who are innocent of any wrongdoing, confiscation may have the
desirable effect of inducing them to exercise greater care in transferring possession of their
property."). When read together, these two passages indicate the Court's belief that husbands
and wives can protect their property interests in family possessions only by being unduly diligent,
and, perhaps, investigating their spouses' activities before allowing them to commute to and from
work in the car.
2. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 688.

3. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 996.
4. State v. Bennis, 504 N.W.2d 731, 732 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993), rev'd, 527 N.W.2d 483
(Mich. 1994), aff'd, 116 S.Ct. 994 (1996).
5. Michigan ex rel. Wayne County Prosecutor v. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d 483, 486 (Mich.
1994), aff'd, 116 S.Ct. 994 (1996).
6. Bennis, 116 S.Ct. at 996-98.
7. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in part: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
8. The Fifth Amendment provides in part: "[N]or shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation." U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
9. Bennis, 116 S.Ct. at 996.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol48/iss2/6
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forfeiture of a privateering ship.' 0 Although Chief Justice Rehnquist touched
upon the rules created by these precedents, he failed to consider fully the
special contexts in which earlier Courts made their holdings. The result is an
anchorless opinion, filled with ancient axioms which aimlessly collide with the
realities of modem property ownership.
This article focuses on the Due Process portion of the Bennis Court's
opinion. After the introduction in Part I, Part II will explore the birth and
evolution of civil in rem forfeiture. That analysis will look closely at the
Court's deference to government forfeiture and its impact upon Due Process.
Also included in the discussion is an investigation of specific facts and
particular problems facing the Court in each hallmark case. Part I will
examine the Bennis opinion itself, and Part IV will assess the damage caused
by the Court's superficial treatment of precedent. Part V will offer a proposal
to correct the Court's current course in civil in rem forfeiture.

II. THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF CIVIL FORFEITURE LAW
The swiftness and potency of modem civil forfeiture statutes arise from
their underlying jurisdictional prerequisites. By proceeding in rem (against the
thing), civil forfeiture allows the circumvention of constitutional rights
generally accorded under criminal forfeiture (which requires the prosecution
to obtain in personam jurisdiction)." That is, the civil in rem label has long
permitted prosecutors to seize property without according to the persons
affected by the forfeiture constitutional rights traditionally extended to criminal
defendants. 2 The in rem character of the proceeding is based on the concept
that the property itself is the wrongdoer; thus the owner of the property is
reduced to nothing more than a mere "bystander."" 3 The Bennis Court
unhesitatingly extended this strained fiction, and the harsh consequences that
flow from it, to family cars.
A. The "Guilty Property" Fiction'sAncient Origins
Chief Justice Rehnquist traced American jurisprudential support for in rem
forfeiture back to the days of privateering on the high seas. " Actually, the
10. Id. at 998.
11. Robert Lieske, Civil ForfeitureLaw: Replacing the Common Law with a Common Sense
Application of the Excessive Fines Clauseof the Eighth Amendment, 21 WM. MrrCHELL L. Rv.
265, 271 (1995).
12. Id.; see Robin M. Sackett, Comment, The Impact of Austin v. United States: Extending
ConstitutionalProtectionsto Claimantsin Civil ForfeitureProceedings,24 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REV. 495, 498 (1994).
13. Mary M. Cheh, Can Something This Easy, Quick, and Profitablealso be Fair?Runaway
Civil Forfeiture Stumbles on the Constitution, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 1, 7 (1994).
14. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 998.
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"guilty property" basis of asset forfeiture which Bennis extended comes from
a much more distant time. Indeed, blaming objects for criminal wrongs
occurred in ancient Greece. 5 The Supreme Court itself has connected the
assumptions underlying today's forfeiture laws to deodand, one of England's
ancient rules of forfeiture. 6 Moreover, the Court has traced the origins of
deodand itself to Biblical times: "[i]f an ox gore a man or a woman, and they
7
die, he shall be stoned: and his flesh shall not be eaten."'
Such an artificial notion has proven to be an easy target for today's judges
and commentators. 8 The guilty property construct has been called "irrational," "superstitious," 9 and an ancient and obsolete common law precept. 20
Nonetheless, it has been adopted by the Supreme Court with surprisingly little
21
resistance since the early nineteenth century.
B. The English Roots
American colonial courts inherited in rem forfeiture from the British.'
England practiced three kinds of forfeiture: deodand, forfeiture of property
upon conviction of a felony or treason, and statutory forfeiture.' The word
15. "'[A]mong the Athenians, whatever was the cause of a man's death, by falling upon him,
was exterminated or cast out of the dominions of the republic.'" J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co.
v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 511 (1921) (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 291 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1979) (1765)); see also Cynthia Sherrill
Wood, Note, Asset Forfeitureand the Excessive Fines Clause:An Epilogue to Austin v. United
States, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1357, 1359 (1994) (discussing the ancient belief that objects
were guilty of wrongful acts committed with them). Wood also discusses the prosecution and
punishment, in several cultures, of inanimate objects for "crimes" they were seen to have
committed. "The Jews, the Greeks, the Romans, the tribes of Southern Asia, the Germanic tribes,
and the Welsh all maintained such a belief." Id. at 1357 n.1 (citing OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES,
JR., THE COMMON LAW 7-11, 17-19 (1881)).
16. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-83 (1974).
17. Id. at 681 n.17 (alteration in original) (quoting Exodus 21:28). Use of this quotation to
bolster the guilty property fiction has received criticism. See Jacob J. Finkelstein, The Goring Ox:
Some HistoricalPerspectiveson Deodands, Forfeitures, Wrongful Death and the WesternNotion
of Sovereignty, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 169 (1973).
18. See Tamara R. Piety, Comment, Scorched Earth:How the Expansionof Civil Forfeiture
DoctrineHas Laid Waste to Due Process, 45 U. MIAMI L. REv. 911,918-20 (1991) (presenting
an extensive and impressive catalogue of criticisms of the "personification fiction").
19. Cheh, supra note 13, at 6-7.
20. See Lieske, supra note 11, at 292-93.
21. The Court has acknowledged "apparent paradoxes" created by the operation of the guilty
property fiction. See J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505,510 (1921).
22. J. William Snyder, Jr., Note, Reining in Civil ForfeitureLaw and ProtectingInnocent
Ownersfrom Civil Asset Forfeiture:United States v. 92 Buena Vista Avenue, 72 N.C.L. REV.
1333, 1342 (1994).
23. Michael J. Munn, Note, The Aftermath of Austin v. United States: When Is Civil
Forfeiture an Excessive Fine? 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1255, 1261.
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deodand derives from the Latin term Deo dandum, meaning "to be given to
God."' At English common law, the Crown employed this form of action
to obtain the value of any animate or inanimate object which was "the direct
agenti- of a man's death."'
Several rationales have been advanced to explain the practice of deodand.
None have proven to be fully consistent or logically convincing. The Supreme
Court has identified a religious purpose behind this kind of forfeiture:
At common law the value of an inanimate object directly or indirectly
causing the accidental death of a King's subject was forfeited to the Crown
as a deodand. The origins of the deodand are traceable to Biblical and preJudeo-Christian practices, which reflected the view that the instrument of
death was accused and that religious expiation was required. The value of
the instrument was forfeited to the King, in the belief that the King would
provide the money for Masses to be said for the good of the dead man's
soul, or insure that the deodand was put to charitable uses.' 6
Deodand's forfeitures, however, did not stop when its religious rationale
ceased to exist. The Crown simply changed the justification of this revenue
source to that of a "penalty for carelessness." 27 Indeed, England's abolition
of deodand in 1846 "went hand in hand with the passage of Lord Campbell's
Any explanation,
Act creating a cause of action for wrongful death."'
however, of the use of deodand as a means to prevent negligence is flawed.
Forfeiture to the Crown occurred regardless of the owner's fault, or lack
thereof, as the object of death was seen as the offender.29
An alternate theory is that deodand offered a safe government substitute
for revenge by the victim's family.3' Yet, commentators have also found
holes in this rationale. 3' Still another justification advanced for deodand was

24. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 681 n.16 (1974).
25. Finkelstein, supra note 17, at 185; see Lieske, supranote 11, at 272-73; Piety, supra note
18, at 928; Sackett, supra note 12, at 499.
26. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 680-81 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).
27. Id. at 681.
28. Id. at 681 n.19; see Sackett, supra note 12, at 499-500.
29. See Lieske, supra note 11, at 273-74; Piety, supra note 18, at 931.
30. See Piety, supra note 18, at 929, in which the author explains that deodand may have
blunted the family's urge for "private justice." The retribution theory received support from the
existence of "noxal surrender," a possible ancestor of deodand. This Anglo-Saxon form of
forfeiture was in common use at the time of Alfred the Great in the late ninth century. Piety,
supra note 18, at 929 n.84; see Finkelstein, supra note 17, at 181.
31. The family vengeance explanation is problematic because deodand was not based on
human fault. For example, when a man falls from his cart and is trampled to death by his own
horses, forfeiting the property to the state under deodand serves no vengeful purpose. See
Finkelstein, supra note 17, at 182; Piety, supra note 18, at 929 n.85.
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the instinctive urge that "leads even [a] civilized man to kick a door when it
pinches his finger." 32 As no concrete evidence exists to pin-point deodand's
source, these explanations are nothing more than educated speculations on
deodand's original purpose.33
There is no modem form of deodand. It was abolished in its country of
34
origin and was never itself adopted as part of American forfeiture law.
Deodand's "guilty property" theme, however, survives in today's forfeiture
statutes. 35 The Supreme Court itself has made the connection between this
ancient form of forfeiture and current legislation: "The modem forfeiture
statutes are the direct descendants of this [English deodand] heritage. "3
England's second type of common law forfeiture occurred upon conviction
of a felony or treason. 37 Unlike deodand, this type of forfeiture was based
on the conduct of the property owner: "The basis for these forfeitures was
that a breach of the criminal law was an offense to the King's peace, which
38
was felt to justify denial of the right to own property.
The United States did not adopt forfeiture upon conviction of a felony or
treason. In fact, the United States Constitution specifically forbade this kind
of forfeiture "except during the Life of the Person attainted. "3 Furthermore,
the First Congress "abolished forfeiture of estate as a punishment for
felons."' However, the underlying assumption that the right of property
ownership can be refused to a criminal has survived as a conceptual basis of
American forfeiture.41
The third form of forfeiture at English common law, the statutory
forfeiture, has survived and is recognized in the United States today.4 2 The
Supreme Court has described this kind of forfeiture as "likely a product of the
confluence and merger of the deodand tradition and the belief that the right to
own property could be denied the wrongdoer. "13
32. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 11 (1881); see Piety, supranote 18,
at 930.
33. See Piety, supra note 18, at 929.
34. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 613 (1993); see Wood, supranote 15, at 1360-61.
35. Lieske, supranote 11, at 271-72; see Lawrence A. Kasten, Note, Extending Constitutional
Protectionto Civil ForfeituresThat Exceed Rough Remedial Compensation, 60 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 194, 198 (1991).
36. United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 720 (1971).
37. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 682 (1974). This form of
forfeiture is also termed "escheat upon attainder" and "forfeiture of estate". See Lieske, supra
note 11, at 272; Wood, supra note 15, at 1361.
38. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 682 (citing BLACKSTONE, supra note 15, at 299).
39. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2.
40. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 613 (1993). England eliminated most forfeitures
based on convictions of felonies or treason in 1870. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 682 n.20.
41. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 682.
42. Austin, 509 U.S. at 614.
43. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 682. One commentator has gone so far as to characterize
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American statutory forfeiture was born in the unique context of admiralty
law during colonial times and the period of confederation.' Its special rules
regarding in rem jurisdiction and the guilty property fiction were crafted out
of necessity. The courts needed to obtain remedies for customs and revenue
violations from otherwise unaccountable owners in far away places. Thus,
United States statutes were modeled after the English Navigation Acts, which
authorized government seizure of ships and their cargoes upon customs
violations.45 Therefore, proceeding in rem was originally a mere product of
practicality: "'The fictions of in rem forfeiture were developed primarily to
expand the reach of the courts,' which, particularly in admiralty proceedings,
might have lacked in personam jurisdiction over the owner of the property."46 Statutory forfeiture has even been analogized to liquidated damages47
as it readily provided a fixed remedy for piracy as well as customs and
Thus, the core concepts of modern civil forrevenue violations.
feiture-proceeding against the thing rather than a person and an object's own
guilt-were not created as broad principles of fairness designed for cases in
general. Quite to the contrary, these fictions were originally established to
address a singular set of problems for a narrow class of offenses.
C. The OriginalForfeiture Cases in the United States: Admiralty
In upholding the forfeiture against Tina Bennis, the Supreme Court relied
heavily on what it termed a "long and unbroken line of cases" starting with
The Palmyra in 1827.48 Given its seminal nature, this early decision deserves
close attention. In The Palmyra, the object of the forfeiture proceedings was
"an armed vessel, asserting herself to be a privateer, and acting under a

forfeiture by statute as "essentially the deodand doctrine encoded into statute." See Lieske, supra

note 11, at 276.
44. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 683. The Court explained:
But "[1long before the adoption of the Constitution the common law courts in the
Colonies-and later in the states during the period of Confederation-were exercising
jurisdiction in rem in the enforcement of [English and local] forfeiture statutes,"
which provided for the forfeiture of commodities and vessels used in violations of
customs and revenue laws.
Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
45. See Sackett, supra note 12, at 501. The Supreme Court mentioned the Navigation Act of
1660 as "[t]he most notable" of such legislation. See Austin, 502 U.S. at 613-14. This law
mandated that shipping of most English commodities be in English ships. A violation by an
individual seaman, acting without the knowledge of the ship's master or owner, could trigger
forfeiture of the entire ship and its cargo. Id.
46. Austin, 509 U.S. at 615 n. 9.
47. See Cheh, supra note 13, at 30; Piety, supra note 18, at 954-55.
48. Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 998 (1996) (citing The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) 1 (1827)).
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commission of the King of Spain, issued by his authorized officer at the Island
of [Puerto] Rico." 4 9 The Palmyra, alias "the Panchita," had attacked a
United States vessel, "the schooner Coquette."" The United States warship,
Grampus, commanded by Lieutenant Gregory, captured the Palmyra and sent
her into port at Charleston, South Carolina."' The Palmyra was libeled and
condemned in admiralty court pursuant to a Congressional act targeting any
"armed vessel" committing "piratical aggression" on any United States
vessel.52 In response to the contention that a criminal conviction against the
pirates was a prerequisite to any forfeiture of the Palmyra, the Court reasoned
that the in rem forfeiture was "wholly unaffected by any criminal proceeding
in personam."53 Indeed, the two proceedings were "independent" of each
other for with in rem forfeiture "[t]he thing is here primarily considered as the
offender[] or rather the offence is attached primarily to the thing."s"
The Court's reference to the guilty property fiction, however strained,
was a useful part of early nineteenth-century admiralty court jurisdiction. At
that time, the world was much larger than it is today. It would have been
difficult to obtain the personal jurisdiction necessary to prosecute owners from
across the Atlantic Ocean. Even if procedural hurdles could somehow be
avoided, a plea of ignorance from distant owners was almost certain.
Furthermore, even if the court found the owners guilty, collection of a fine
would be a logistical impossibility. Thus, simply blaming the boat in a civil
action and confiscating it may have been the only workable alternative in the
early 1800's.
Another pragmatic consideration made forfeiture of ships particularly
attractive. Before the federal income tax was adopted with the passage of the
Sixteenth Amendment, customs duties were a significant source of government
income.'
Hostile actions committed by ships on the high seas endangered
the government's collection of this revenue, thereby undermining the security
of the nation.56 Thus, the government was entitled to and protected by the
ready compensation provided by forfeiture of the very ships that threatened tax
collection.57 Further, in a rough sense of fairness, "'the ship was not only
the source, but the limit, of liability.' "58
49. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 8.
50. Id. at2.
51. Id.at 8.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 15.
54. Id. at 14.
55. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 59 (1993); Piety,
supra note 18, at 940.
56. See Nkechi Taifa, Civil Forfeiture vs. Civil Liberties, 39 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 95, 97
(1994).
57. Id.; Piety, supra note 18, at 940.
58. Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 1005 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol48/iss2/6

8

Dery: Adding Injury to Insult: The Supreme Court's Extension of Civil F

1997]

ADDING INJURY TO INSULT: BENNIS V. MICHIGAN

Justice Story recognized the unique circumstances of these admiralty cases
in The Palmyra. Although he acknowledged that other forfeitures, perhaps
those based upon conviction of a felony or treason, required a judgment of
conviction, such a limit "never was applied to seizures and forfeitures, created
by statute, in rem, cognizable on the revenue side of the Exchequer."59 The
specific reference to the Exchequer illustrates the Court's awareness of the
special revenue aspect of these cases.
Finally, a kind of proportionality existed in these early cases. Because
the "entire mission" of a privateering ship was unlawful, admiralty courts
Harmony v. United States,6
subjected the whole vessel to forfeiture.'
another admiralty case handed down by the Court only 17 years after The
Palmyra, demonstrates the point. In Harmony, a ship named the MalekAdhel,
"bound on an innocent commercial voyage from New York to Guayamas, in
California," fired its cannon on several other ships. 62 The government seized
and condemned the Malek Adhel even though fully conceding that the Malek
Adhel's owners never authorized, participated in, or even contemplated the
piratical acts.' Upon appeal from the ship's owners, the Court reaffirmed
its reliance upon the guilty property fiction: "The vessel which commits the
aggression is treated as the offender, as the guilty instrument or thing to which
the forfeiture attaches, without any reference whatsoever to the character or
conduct of the owner."'
Recognizing the special significance and character of the case, the
Harmony Court noted that it was not uncommon in admiralty to ignore an
owner's lack of complicity in his ship's wrongdoing."6 After all, in admiralty, "this is done from the necessity of the case, as the only adequate means of
suppressing the offence or wrong, or insuring an indemnity to the injured
66
party."

HOLMES, supra note 32, at 30).
59. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 14 (emphasis added).
60. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1005 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing C.J. Hendry Co. V.
Moore, 318 U.S. 133, 145-48 (1943)).
61. 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210 (1844).
62. Id. at 230.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 233.
65. See id. Justice Story stated for the Harnwny Court:
It is not an uncommon course in the admiralty, acting under the law of nations, to
treat the vessel in which or by which, or by the master or crew thereof, a wrong or
offence has been done-as the offender, without any regard whatsoever to the personal
misconduct or responsibility of the owner thereof.
Id.
66. Id. The Court also recognized the application of the doctrine in the "kindred cases" of
smuggling, embargo, non-intercourse, and revenue. Id. at 233-34.
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In the main, cases like The Palmyra and Harmony demonstrate that a
peculiar set of factors commonly combined in admiralty cases of the 1800's
and persuaded the Court to maintain the guilty property fiction and the in rem
nature of forfeiture proceedings: jurisdictional problems, logistical concerns,
and government revenue considerations.
D. The Revenue Cases: Intoxicating Liquor and Taxes
The next group of rulings relied upon by the Bennis Court derived from
revenue cases handed down after the Civil War. The Court has always placed
these cases of government revenue and debt collection into a category of
special need. As recently as the 1993 term, the Court recognized government
action in revenue cases as being based upon "executive urgency."67 Indeed,
the Court noted that "'[t]he prompt payment of taxes ... may be vital to the
existence of government. "68 Prior to the creation of the federal income tax
in 1913, "the Federal Government relied heavily on liquor, customs, and
tobacco taxes to generate operating revenues. In 1902, for example, nearly
75 percent of total federal revenues-$479 million out of $653 million-was
raised from taxes on liquor, customs, and tobacco." 69 Thus, over the
centuries, the Court has consistently recognized the singular importance of
revenue cases as a class.
The first of the revenue decisions cited in Bennis, is Dobbins'sDistillery
v. United States.70 In Dobbins'sthe owner of a distillery leased his premises
to another who actually ran the operations. This operator altered the
distillery's books in order to defraud the government of tax revenue. 71 The
government responded by seizing the real property, distillery apparatus, and
spirits. And, in turn, the property owner claimed his innocence as a defense
against forfeiture. 72 In upholding the seizure, the Court again distinguished
the special cases of revenue and admiralty from other common law forfeiture
proceedings.73
Writing for the Court, Justice Clifford noted that the
67. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 60 (1993).
68. Id. (quoting Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 594 (1881)). Additionally, the
Court quoted from G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338 (1977) the following;
"The rationale underlying [the revenue] decisions, of course, is that the very existence of
government depends upon the prompt collection of the revenues." Id. at 352 n.18 (alteration in

original).
69. James Daniel Good, 510 U.S. at 60.
70. 96 U.S. 395 (1877).
71. Id. at 396.
72. Id. at 397.
73. Id. at 400. To be precise, the Court stated:
Forfeitures, in many cases of felony, did not attach at common law where the
proceeding was in rem until the offender was convicted, as the crown, Judge Story
says, had no right to the goods and chattels of the felon, without producing the record
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol48/iss2/6
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"doctrine" which called for forfeiture despite an owner's lack of fault was
"familiarly applied to cases of smuggling and other misconduct under the
revenue laws, as well as to other cases arising under the embargo and nonintercourse acts of Congress."'

4

Justice Clifford also defended the guilty

property fiction in the distillery context by analogizing such an operation to the
sailing of a ship:
iTihe ship, as a body, is animated and put in action by the crew, who are
guided by the master. The vessel acts and speaks by the master; she
reports herself by the master. It is, therefore, not unreasonable that the
vessel should be affected by this report.
Apply that rule to the case before the court, and it follows that the
distillery, and the real and personal property used in connection with the
same, must be considered as affected by the unlawful doings and omissions
of the lessee and occupant of the property as a distillery ....75
The Dobbins's Distillery Court also weighed the formal impact of an
owner sending his ship off with a master and crew:
[I]t has always been held in such cases that the acts of the master and crew
bind the interest of the owner of the ship, whether he be innocent or
guilty, and that in sending the ship to sea under their charge he impliedly
submits to whatever the law denounces as a forfeiture attached to the ship
by means of their unlawful or wanton misconduct.76

When Dobbins'sDistillery extended forfeiture from ships to dry land, it
did so only through recognition and reinforcement of a common uniqueness
in these cases. In rem forfeiture was allowed because the peculiar concerns
of revenue collection existed and because, in the formalized business context,
an otherwise elusive owner must submit to the fate of forfeiture for the actions
of his property's possessors. Justice Clifford's recognition of these special
circumstances limited the logical reach of in rem forfeiture precedent.

of his conviction; but that rule, as the same learned magistrate says, was never
applied to seizures and forfeitures created by statute in rem, cognizable on the
revenue side of the exchequer court, for the reason that the thing in such a case is
primarily considered as the offender, or rather that the offense is attached primarily
to the thing, whether the offence be malum prohibium or malum in se; and he adds,
that the same principles apply to proceedings in rem in the admiralty.
Id. at 399-400 (citing The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827)).
74. Id. at 401.
75. Id. at 402.
76. Id. at 401.
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The Bennis Court considered another forfeiture case based on a revenue
violation, J. W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States.77 In that case, the
Grant Company, an automobile dealer, sold a Hudson car to J.G. Thompson
and W.M. Lamb and retained the car's title as security for the unpaid balance.
Thompson, along with others, used the car to transport 58 gallons of distilled
spirits in violation of federal tax law. 7' The illegal acts were, however,
committed without the Grant Company's knowledge or authorization.
Nonetheless, the jury "found the car guilty" and called for it to be forfeit9
7

ed.

Upon review of the parties' contentions, Justice McKenna, writing for the
majority, made a candid acknowledgment:
If the case were the first of its kind, it and its apparent paradoxes
might compel a lengthy discussion to harmonize the section with the
accepted tests of human conduct. Its words taken literally forfeit property
illicitly used though the owner of it did not participate in or have
knowledge of the illicit use. There is strength, therefore, in the contention
that, if such be the inevitable meaning of the section, it seems to violate
that justice which should be the foundation of the due process of law
required by the Constitution.80
Justice McKenna found this argument in the "abstraction" to be "formidable.""1 The contention, however, lost its force when balanced against certain
"militating considerations. "I First, Justice McKenna referred to the revenue
nature of the governing statute. He determined that "the necessities of the
Government, its revenues and policies" forced Congress to co-opt property
owners in the prevention of violations or evasions of congressional acts.83
Somewhat like in the days of deodand, the government enlisted an owner's
care and responsibility over property by ascribing it with a "certain personality, a power of complicity and guilt in the wrong."' Thus, in the uniquely
vital area of revenue law, the state could draft owners into the cause of tax
collection by threatening forfeiture of their property should it be used in
violation of tax laws.

77. 254 U.S. 505 (1921).

78. Id. at 508-09.
79. Id. at 509. The company's officers, further, had no reason to suspect that the Hudson
would be illegally used. Id.
80. Id. at 510.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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The second militating factor cited by Justice McKenna was the crushing
force of history: "[W]hether the reason for § 3450 [, the actual statute
violated by Thompson,] be artificial or real, it is too firmly fixed in the
punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the country to be now displaced. "I
In other words, after over ninety years of bad rulings resting on the guilty
property fiction, it is simply too lite to turn back now. It is questionable
whether either of Justice McKenna's two factors is persuasive. Certainly
though, as will be discussed in Part III, neither offers a foundation for the
ruling in Bennis.
E. The Contraband Cases
The Bennis Court discussed Goldsmith-GrantCo. in conjunction with Van
Oster v. Kansas. 6 The two cases, however, are quite distinct. While
Goldsmith-Grant Co., a traditional revenue case, maintained the limits of
earlier forfeiture cases, Van Oster involved the forfeiture of contraband. True,
both cases dealt with the forfeitures of cars, but the similarities end there.
Van Oster, written a century after The Palmyra, represents a dramatic
departure from this case and its progeny. The owner in Van Oster bought a
car from a local dealership and agreed, as part of the deal, that the seller could
retain possession for business uses." With the owner's knowledge, the car
dealer allowed its associate, Clyde Brown, to "make frequent use of the
automobile." 88 Mr. Brown used the car to transport alcohol in violation of
Kansas state law. 9 The distinction is clear; the forfeiture in Van Oster was
not for violation of admiralty or revenue statutes-it was for violation of a
state law prohibiting liquor traffic.
Perhaps recognizing its dramatic departure from precedent, the Van Oster
Court cast about for support outside of the traditional forfeiture cases. Justice
Stone, writing for the Court, mentioned cases involving the loss of property
to private parties, such as claims in bailment and liens.' ° He further reached
down into the district courts for support and cited two cases involving
forfeiture of automobiles for illegal liquor traffic among the Indians. 9"
Flying in the face of carefully tailored precedent dating back to 1827, Justice
Stone concluded that no "valid distinction" could be made between forfeitures

85. Id. at 511.
86. 272 U.S. 465 (1926).
87. Id. at 465-66.
88. Id. at 466.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 467.
91. Id. at 468. The two cases, United States v. One Buick RoadsterAutomobile,244 F. 961
(E.D. Okla. 1917) and United States v. One Seven-PassengerPaige Car,259 F. 641 (E.D. Okla.
1919), both hinged on a statute no longer in force.
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based on the federal government's taxing power and Kansas' property seizure
grounded in state police powers.' Thus, in one case, the Court itself cut
loose from a century of limits on in rem forfeiture.'
According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court's final word on
in rem forfeiture, before Bennis, was delivered in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson
Yacht Leasing Co.94 Calero-Toledo marked in rem forfeiture's return to the
world of ships. Pearson Yacht Leasing Company, the property owner, leased
a pleasure yacht to two Puerto Rican residents. Two months later, Puerto
Rican authorities discovered marijuana on the yacht, charged the lessees with
controlled substance violations and seized the boat.' 5 Arguing that they were
neither aware of nor involved in the illegal activity on board their property,
the yacht's owners contested the forfeiture. 96
Pearson Yacht Company's "innocent owner" defense caused Justice
Brennan, writing for the Calero-Toledo majority, to delve into in rem
forfeiture's ancient origins. Justice Brennan even pondered the original
justifications for deodand and deemed them to be religious.17 Further,
recognizing that the use of deodand had outstripped its initial religious purpose
only to be rationalized as a penalty for carelessness, the Calero-Toledo Court
cited a particularly relevant passage by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes:
"The customs, beliefs, or needs of a primitive time establish a rule or a
formula. In the course of centuries the custom, belief, or necessity
disappears, but the rule remains. The reason which gave rise to the rule
has been forgotten, and ingenious minds set themselves to inquire how it
is to be accounted for. Some ground of policy is thought of, which seems
to explain it and to reconcile it with the present state of things; and then
the rule adapts itself to the new reasons which have been found for it, and
enters on a new career."98

92. Id.
93. Prior to Van Oster, any departures from the admiralty or revenue contexts were narrow
or short lived. The relatively quick expiration of these enactments was often due to the short
duration of their historical necessity. For instance, in 1794 and beyond, Congress enacted civil
forfeiture laws allowing confiscation of ships involved in the slave trade. See Snyder, supra note
22, at 1342 n.87. Additionally, during the Civil War, Congress enacted legislation providing for
confiscation of the property of those engaged in rebellion. See Munn, supra note 23, at 1261-62
n.53. These laws have, of course, been repealed.
Yet, the Civil War laws were aimed at preserving the security of the nation, a basis also
underlying revenue statutes.

94. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 665.
at 664.
at 681; see also supra notes 16, 17 and accompanying text.
at 681 n.19 (quoting HOLM-s, supra note 32, at 5).
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In this sense, Justice Brennan considered deodand to have some current
relevance. He surmised that deodand combined with the belief that a
wrongdoer could be denied property ownership rights to form the basis of the
English statutory forfeiture laws. 9 These statutes in turn created a template
for American in rem forfeiture. Thus, in a post-Van Oster case, the Court
returned to the presumption that modern in rem forfeiture's fictions were in
some respects linked to deodand, a practice based on rationales retaining little
modem relevance. Moreover, Calero-Toledo's history tour acknowledged the
narrow subject matter covered by United States statutes when forfeiture was
first codified.100 In sum, Calero-Toledo, the decision cited by Chief Justice
Rehnquist as the most recent case on point, reaffirmed two strands in the long
line of precedent that are particularly unhelpful to one wishing to extend in
rem forfeiture to a family car: (1) the fictions undergirding in rem jurisdiction
derive from deodand, a practice based even at its inception upon questionable
rationales; and (2) the case law establishing in rem forfeiture in our nation was
extremely narrow in scope.
Of course, Justice Brennan also recognized the dramatic expansion of
forfeiture legislation in modem times: "[C]ontemporary federal and state
forfeiture statutes reach virtually any type of property that might be used in the
conduct of a criminal enterprise."101 He gave no reasoned explanation,
however, for the huge expansion. Indeed, the rationale offered for forfeiture
of property owned by innocents in a narcotics context was simply that
"confiscation may have the desirable effect of inducing them to exercise
greater care in transferring possession of their property."'" If confiscation's
ability to deter carelessness were sufficient reason for seizure of an innocent
owner's property, why did the Court, for at least a century, consistently extol
the unique importance of admiralty and revenue cases? Calero-Toledo left
future Courts a conflicted legacy. Through this case, the Court acknowledged
the reality that the government had vastly extended its use of forfeiture; yet,
it failed to provide an adequate explanation for this expansion.
III. BENNIS V. MICHIGAN'S UNREASONED EXTENSION OF IN REM FORFEITURE

The Bennis Court's extension of government forfeiture powers arose out
of a gross indecency case. On October 3, 1988,103 John Bennis was sup-

99. Id. at 682.
100. The Court noted that laws in force "almost immediately after adoption of the Constitution" regulated customs and deliveries of slaves. Id. at 683.

101. Id.
102. Id. at 688.
103. Michigan ex reL Wayne County Prosecutor v. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d 483, 486 (Mich.
1994). The lower appellate court indicated the date the incident occurred was March 3, 1988.
See State v. Bennis, 504 N.W.2d 731, 737 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993). This would conflict,
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posed to be driving home from work in his family's 1977 Pontiac automobile." ° However, Detroit undercover vice officers, Jacob Anthony and John
Howe, observed Mr. Bennis stop the Pontiac at the comer of Eight Mile and
Sheffield, where Kathy Polarchio was standing." °5 Ms. Polarchio, a prostitute, had previously attracted the police officers' attention by "flagging" at

motorists to solicit business."° After Ms. Polarchio approached and entered
the passenger's side of the car, Mr. Bennis drove down the street one block,
made a U-turn, parked, and turned off his headlights. Having followed Mr.
Bennis, the vice officers approached the Pontiac and shined a flashlight into
the front seat. There, they observed Ms. Polarchio performing an act of
fellatio on Mr. Bennis. "0 Officers Anthony and Howe arrested John Bennis,
who was later convicted of gross indecency in violation of section 750.338b
of the Michigan Code. 08
The State of Michigan then sued both John Bennis and his wife, Tina B.
Bennis, to have the Pontiac declared a public nuisance and abated under
Michigan Compiled Laws sections 600.3801, 600.3825." ° Tina and John

however, with the Michigan Supreme Court's reference to a security guard's testimony that he
had seen Mr. Bennis in an area, known for prostitution, "during the summer before Bennis'
October 3, 1988 arrest." Michigan ex rel. Wayne County, 527 N.W.2d at 488.
104. Michigan ex rel. Wayne County, 527 N.W. 2d at 486.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 996 (1996). Section 600.3801 of the Michigan Code
provides in pertinent part:
Any building, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or place used for the purpose of lewdness,
assignation or prostitution or gambling, or used by, or kept for the use of prostitutes
or other disorderly persons .... is declared a nuisance,... and all ... nuisances
shall be enjoined and abated as provided in this act and as provided in the court rules.
Any person or his or her servant, agent, or employee who owns, leases, conducts,
or maintains any building, vehicle, or place used for any of the purposes or acts set
forth in this section is guilty of a nuisance.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.3801 (West Supp. 1996).
Further, section 600.3825 of the Michigan Code provides in pertinent part:
(1) Order of abatement. If the existence of the nuisance is established in an action
as provided in this chapter, an order of abatement shall be entered as part of the
judgment in the case, which order shall direct the removal from the building or place
of all furniture, fixtures and contents therein and shall direct the sale thereof in the
manner provided for the sale of chattels under execution ....
(2) Vehicles, sale. Any vehicle, boat, or aircraft found by the court to be a
nuisance within the meaning of this chapter, is subject to the same order and
judgment as any furniture, fixtures and contents as herein provided.
(3) Sale of personalty, costs, liens, balance to state treasurer. Upon the sale of
any furniture, fixture, contents, vehicle, boat or aircraft as provided in this section,
the officer executing the order of the court shall, after deducting the expenses of
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Bennis had purchased the car as joint owners three weeks before the
arrest. 110 In fact, Tina acquired her interest in the Pontiac by spending
money she had earned independently. Il ' In defending her interest in the
Pontiac, Tina Bennis advised the Court that, when she entrusted her husband
to use the car, she had no knowledge that he would use it to violate the State's
indecency laws. 1 Tina was so ignorant of her husband's criminal activity
that she even called "Missing Persons" when John Bennis failed to come home
on the night of his arrest. 1
The trial judge was unmoved by Tina Bennis' innocence. Michigan's
abatement statute specifically precluded lack of knowledge of the nuisance as
a defense." 4 The trial court therefore declared the car a public nuisance and
ordered its abatement. 1 5 The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the trial
judge, holding in part that Michigan precedent forbade the abatement of an
owner's interest absent a showing of knowledge of the property's illegal
use.116 The Michigan Supreme Court rejected the intermediate court's
interpretation of the state's case law regarding innocent owners. Finding an
owner's knowledge of illegal use not to be controlling, the state supreme court
reversed the court of appeals and "reinstated the abatement in its entirety."117 Further, Michigan's highest court detected no federal constitutional
infirmities with the abatement law. 1 8
The United States Supreme Court granted writ of certiorari in order to
consider whether Michigan's nuisance and abatement laws had deprived Tina
Bennis of property in violation of her Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
rights or taken her property interest for public use without compensation in
violation of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause (as incorporated by the
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
Fourteenth Amendment). 1 9

keeping such property and costs of such sale, pay all liens according to their priorities
.... and shall pay the balance to the state treasurer to be credited to the general
fund of the state.
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.3825 (West 1987).
110. State v. Bennis, 504 N.W.2d at 734,
111. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1008 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 997.
113. Id. at 1008 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
114. "Proof of knowledge of the existence of the nuisance on the part of the defendants or any
of them, is not required." MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.3815(2) (West 1987). See also
Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 997, n.4.
115. Bennis, 116 S.Ct. at 997.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Michigan ex reL Wayne County Prosecutor v. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d 483, 493-95.
119. Bennis, 116 S.Ct. at 997-98.
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majority, held that the forfeiture of Tina Bennis' interests offended neither due
process nor the Takings Clause. 20
More revealing than its holding was the Court's rationale, or lack thereof.
Chief Justice Relnquist began the substance of the majority opinion with a
simple observation: "[A] long and unbroken line of cases holds that an
owner's interest in property may be forfeited by reason of the use to which the
property is put even though the owner did not know that it was to be put to
such use."..' The remainder of the Court's due process analysis is barely
more than a listing of holdings back to 1827. Chief Justice Rehnquist's
opinion touches upon precedent like a stone skipping across water, never going
deeper than the surface of each case. The result is accuracy without truth.
The first remarkable aspect of the Bennis Court's opinion is the total lack
of attention given to any possible source of the fundamental concepts
underlying in rem forfeiture. This omission is all the more curious in light of
the importance attributed to deodand by prior Courts." By omitting any
reference to deodand, the Court neatly avoided the necessity of having to
consider the various explanations offered for its purpose." More importantly, Chief Justice Rehnquist did not have to confront the reality that none of the
original bases of in rem forfeiture have relevance in today's legal proceedings.
Thus, at the outset, the Bennis Court chose to unquestioningly promote the
ancient legal fiction of the guilt of inanimate objects.
The Court dutifully began its civil forfeiture discussion with a citation to
its "earliest opinion" on the issue, The Palmyra.2 4 After a brief recitation
of the case's facts and the parties' contentions, Chief Justice Rehnquist
reflexively quoted The Palmyra axiom:
"The thing is here primarily
considered as the offender, or rather the offense is attached primarily to the
thing. " " Without application of this rule to the facts of Bennis, the Court
merely moved on seventeen years to the next case, Harmony v. United
26 The
States."'
Chief Justice then simply quoted Harmony's language that the
wrongs of a ship's master and crew support a forfeiture "'whether [the owner]
be innocent or guilty.'"27
The Court made no attempt to connect the worlds of admiralty in the
nineteenth century to prostitution in the twentieth century. This is of course
because any such attempt would be futile. The ships on the high seas in the

120. Id. at 996.
121. Id. at 998.
122. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-82 (1974); J.W.
Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 510 (1921).
123. See supra notes 25-30.
124. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 998 (citing The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827)).
125. Id. (quoting The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 14).
126. Id. (citing Harmony v. United States, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210 (1844)).
127. Id. (quoting Harmony, 43 U.S. (2 How.) at 234).
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1800's were highly valuable pieces of property. In fact, they were so
valuable, that it would be fair to presume the owner of such a ship would be
aware of its principal use."i This is particularly true considering the limited
range of activities open to an armed merchant ship: either it legitimately
participates in trade, or it violently disrupts the trade of others. In contrast,
John Bennis presumably drives the family car out of the house's garage with
much more frequency and much less formality than a ship weighs anchor.
Further, being a versatile tool used in connection with a myriad of activities,
the family car is arguably more difficult to monitor.
Moreover, the very nature of ships allows them to "actually facilitateD"
the offenses in question.2 9 Ships were not only vessels for transport of
pirated property but also the very weapon used to gain others' goods in the
first place. Quite simply, one commits piracy on the high seas only by use of
the ship. In contrast, the Bennis' car "bore no necessary connection to the
offense committed by petitioner's husband. It is true that the act occurred in
the car, but it might just as well have occurred in a multitude of other
The Bennis decision even appeared to mask the fact
locations." 13
that the foundational cases for United States in rem forfeiture took place in as
unique a subject of law as admiralty. In quoting language of the admiralty
case, Harmony, the Bennis majority was curiously selective. Chief Justice
Rehnquist removed the limiting language that the Harmony Court had
embedded in the middle of its rule. Harmony held that the masters' and
crew's actions "in cases of this sort, bind the interest of the owner of the
ship.""' The "sort" of cases Harmony focused on were the "kindred cases"
of "embargo," "non-intercourse," "smuggling," and "revenue" violations.'
Further, Chief Justice Rehnquist borrowed Harmony's ruling without
mentioning the rationale behind the case's conclusion. The reason relied on
in Harmony, and conveniently absent in Bennis, for admiralty's common use
of the guilty property fiction is bald necessity. Prosecuting the ship was "the
only adequate means of suppressing the offence or wrong, or insuring an
indemnity to the injured party."13 By failing to acknowledge these underlying reasons for Harmony'spromotion of the guilty property fiction, Bennis was
free to ignore the existence today of alternative means for preventing wrongs
or for providing indemnity. In its surgical selection of language from

128. See id. at 1005 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 1005 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 1006 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
131. Harmony v. United States, 43 (2 How.) 210, 234 (1844) (emphasis added).
132. Id. at 233-34. The Harmony Court made other references to the unique subject matter
with which it was dealing. For instance, Justice Story asserted for the Court that "[t]he act of
Congress has therefore done nothing more on this point than to affirm and enforce the general
principles of the maritime law and the law of nations." Id. at 235 (emphasis added).
133. Id. at 233.
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admiralty precedent, the Bennis Court invoked the letter of case law while
ignoring its spirit.
Chief Justice Rehnquist maintained this surface treatment when he
proceeded to the revenue and bootlegging cases. The Court cited Dobbins's
Distillery v. United States to verify that "'[c]ases often arise'" where an
owner's property is forfeited due to others' wrongdoings, despite the fact that
"'the owner is otherwise without fault... and it has always been held...
that the acts of the [possessors] bind the interest of the owner. . . whether he
be innocent or guilty.'"134 Again, the most notable words in this quotation
were the ones Chief Justice Rehnquist omitted. Some of the language deleted
by Bennis delimits the narrow subject matter of forfeiture cases. For instance,
Chief Justice Rehnquist's first ellipses hid the following phrase: "[A]nd Judge
Story remarked, in the case last cited, that the doctrine is familiarly applied
to cases of smuggling and other misconduct under the revenue laws, as well
as to other cases arising under the embargo and non-intercourse acts of
Congress."' 35 The third ellipses concealed the fact that the owner involved
was of unusual character; he was a ship owner. 3 6 The consistent tailoring
of precedent's language altered the force of the quoted rules. Instead of
remaining statements regarding the confines of eighteenth-century admiralty
law, Bennis' overhauled quotations imply much broader pronouncements on
due process in general.
Finally, Justice Clifford spilled much ink in extending admiralty forfeiture
doctrines to the Dobbins's Distillery. He took pains to bring the ships at issue
to life. Vessels were "put in action by the crew" and acted and spoke "by the
master."' 7 He then similarly animated the distillery, with all of its "real
and personal property used" in connection with the production of liquor.'
This effort to remain true to the logical force of the language in precedent was
not followed in Bennis. Nor could it be. The Bennis' Pontiac was not "put
into action" as a ship is by its sailors; it sat stationary while it was used as a
mere site for an indecent act. If, constrained by the guilty property fiction,
we are ever to bring the family car to life, it will be during its principal tasks:
on the commute to work, carrying groceries home from the market, or taking
the children to soccer practice. The Bennis' car simply served as a public
criminal setting, much like the municipal park or the city beach. Thus, when
Chief Justice Rehnquist equated a 1977 Pontiac with a privateering ship and
a distillery, he forced archaic rules pertaining to centuries-old struggles over

134. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. 998 (quoting Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395, 401
(1878)) (omissions in original).
135. Dobbins's Distillery, 96 U.S. at 401 (emphasis added).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 402.
138. Id.
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maritime property and revenue collection into the Procrustean bed of
Michigan's current nuisance laws.
The Bennis Court gave similar treatment to Van Oster v. Kansas139 and
J. W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States. 140 The latter case, however, was too complex to be passed over so quickly. As previously noted,
Justice McKenna, writing for the majority, acknowledged the "formidable"
force of the owner's contention that these kinds of forfeitures raise troubling
due process concerns. 41 The Goldsmith-Grant Co. majority attempted to
address these concerns by pointing out the "militating considerations" like (1)
the unique problems encountered in the singular subject matter of these cases,
(revenue), and (2) the march of history. If Justice McKenna's "militating
considerations" are weak responses, at least they represent an attempt to
confront the issues of the case. The Bennis Court, with the faintest of
allusions to Goldsmith-Grant Co.'s concerns, lacked Justice McKenna's
intellectual honesty. Chief Justice Rehnquist did, however, isolate for
quotation Justice McKenna's comments regarding jurisprudential history:
"'[W]hether the reason for [the challenged forfeiture scheme] be artificial or
real, it is too firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the
country to be now displaced.'" 14 2 If this was meant as a justification for the
Bennis Court's unquestioning reliance on the holdings of previous case law,
it was weak support indeed. Rather than bolstering the Court's approach, this
language points to the problem created by uncritical adoption of statements
from prior cases. It simply layers bad rulings each on top of the other.
Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist relied on the Goldsmith-Grant Co.
Court's dodge of an issue as precedent for his placing the Bennis Court's head
in the sand. Dutifully, Justice Stevens was the telltale. In his dissenting
opinion, he echoed the argument advanced by the Grant Company in
Goldsmith-Grant Co.-that the force of the Court's logic against innocent
owners would require the forfeiture of an ocean liner should one of its
passengers have sinned on board. 143 As Justice McKenna did over 75 years
ago in Goldsmith-GrantCo., Chief Justice Rehnquist responded that "'[w]hen
such application shall be made it will be time enough to pronounce upon
it.'" 144 That time has not only arrived; 45 it has passed. As a business,

139. 272 U.S. 465 (1926).
140. 254 U.S. 505 (1921).
141. See Goldsmith-Grant Co., 254 U.S. at 510.
142. Bennis, 116 S.Ct. at 999 (quoting Goldsmith-Grant Co., 254 U.S. at 510) (alterations
in the original).
143. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1005 (Stevens, J.,dissenting) (citing Goldsmith-Grant Co., 254
U.S. at 512).
144. Bennis, 116. S. Ct. at 1000 (quoting Goldsmith-Grant Co., 254 U.S. at 512.)
145. "That time has arrived when the State forfeits a woman's car because her husband has
secretly committed a misdemeanor inside it." Id. at 1010 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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an ocean liner corporation can institute security measures or even insure
against future forfeiture. In contrast, a spouse realistically cannot and would
not choose these options. Further, the government intrusion visited on a wife
by forfeiture due to her husband's infidelity dwarfs the forfeiture of even an
ocean liner, for as fully discussed in Part IV, it dictates that spouses follow
certain rules regarding family life.
Chief Justice Rehnquist finished Bennis' line of reasoning by quoting the
"most recent decision on point," Calero-Toledo: "'[T]he innocence of the
owner of property subject to forfeiture has almost uniformly been rejected as
a defense.'" ' 46 Of course, Tina Bennis had pointed out that the same
decision also recognized the difficulty in rejecting an owner's constitutional
claim if he proved "not only that he was uninvolved in and unaware of the
wrongful activity, but also that he had done all that reasonably could be
expected to prevent the proscribed use of his property.""' True to form,
the Bennis Court avoided dealing with this language based on its merits and
instead simply labeled it obiter dictum. 4 ' Most alarming was Chief Justice
Rehnquist's reference to Calero-Toledo's rationale that forfeiture in essence
provides incentive for a property owner to avoid negligent transfers of his or
her property to wrongdoers. Just what should Tina Bennis have done to avoid
committing negligence in allowing her husband to drive the family car?
Families are in large measure built on the institution of marriage, which in
turn is based on trust. Is the Court meaning to drive a wedge into families,
requiring verifications and investigations normally employed only against
strangers? Even if Tina Bennis wished to follow the logic of the Court's
approach and limit her husband's use of the car, how would she do so?
Would she institute some formal proceeding of transfer of property? Such a
concept is ridiculous. Furthermore, it is usually impossible, for many spouses
both have keys to the family car. The specter of government rule-making
regarding use of property within the family is beyond reason.'49
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrapped up the Court's review of precedent with
this unbuttressed conclusion: "Petitioner is in the same position as the various
146. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 999 (quoting Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416
U.S. 663, 683 (1974)). Interestingly, Chief Justice Rehnquist was able to characterize CaleroToledo as the Court's most recent case dealing with the innocent owner issue because he
dismissed the "innocent owner defense" in Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993) as not
on point. Austin, as discussed in Part V, infra, was a forfeiture case in which the Court held that
the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment applied to government forfeitures under a
federal statute. Chief Justice Rehnquist's narrow treatment of Austin enabled him to avoid the
implications and concerns raised in this recent decision.
147. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 689.
148. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 999.
149. One wonders if the Court would invite this kind of scrutiny even among business invitees.
Do we want tourists subjected to background checks before being given a room or renting an
automobile?
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owners involved in the forfeiture cases beginning with The Palmyra in
1827."11° Again, only by turning a blind eye to history, factual settings, and
rationales can the Chief Justice make such an assertion.
IV. BENNIS' DAMAGE TO DUE PROCESS
A. Bennis Legitimizes a Curiously Selective View of History
The Bennis Court employed an internally inconsistent approach to history.
It selectively chose which rulings it wished to acknowledge, donning blinders
against inconvenient facts and awkward rationales. Yet, at the same time, the
Court embraced, wholesale and without thought, the law it did decide to
recognize. Bennis' selective memory not only tortures logic but also
undermines due process.
Chief Justice Rehnquist took in rem forfeiture back to the days of
maritime seizures, of the Palmyra and the Malek Adhel. The very core of
these confiscations, however, was fiction. For instance, "the ship itself
becomes animated by the actions of her master and crew, and therefore can be
'guilty' of committing piracy." Also, "with forfeiture, the state is acting
against only the vessel itself and so the owner is not in need of the traditional
constitutional protections." The Bennis Court never stopped to weigh the
continuing wisdom of these artificial constructs. It never delved into their
past. Chief Justice Rehnquist could therefore avoid admitting the irrelevance
of a centuries-old doctrine that was originally based on grounds possibly
religious or even vengeful, but now truly unknown.
The Bennis Court even dodged the reasoning undergirding more
contemporary cases. As recently as 1993, the Court identified the revenue
aspect of forfeiture cases as a relevant factor."' Chief Justice Rehnquist
curiously overlooked this unique rationale of sustaining the very existence of
government. Instead, he only cherry-picked favorable language from the
revenue precedents.
Thus, the Bennis Court unthinkingly grabbed at conclusions without
considering their premises. Chief Justice Rehnquist's Herculean exercise in
overlooking particular facts and distinctive rationales of precedent enabled him
to work in blissful ignorance. Privateering ships sailing even before the use
of steam and distilleries in the years of prohibition were likened to today's
family car. Crucial differences in factual circumstances were papered over by
deleting references in the language of prior cases. Holdings, thus sanitized,
were given a general meaning they did not deserve.

150. Bennis, 116 S.Ct. at 999.
151. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 60 (1993); see also
J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 510 (1921) (revenue case).
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B. The Bennis Court's Illogical Juxtaposition of Cases Created Unintended
Consequences
The result of Chief Justice Rehnquist's comparing apples to oranges is the
manufacture of illogical extremes. By likening the cases of today's car buyer
and that of Hannony's ship owner, the Court shoehorned Tina Bennis into an
artificially formal relationship with her own husband. If the Malek Adhel's
owner "impliedly submit[ted] to whatever the law denounces as a forfeiture,"15 so too did Tina Bennis when she allowed her husband to drive the
Pontiac out of the driveway. Yet, the Malek Adhel's owner, having at most
a business relationship with the relative strangers who would master and crew
his ship, could be expected to protect against any wrongs his business partner
might commit, much as he would factor in any other cost of doing business.
Just as an entrepreneur would hedge against price fluctuations or the
occurrence of natural disasters, the owner would prepare to absorb the damage
done by a rogue among masters and crew.
Does the Bennis Court truly expect Tina Bennis to follow the lead of the
ship owner? Must she be forced to "impliedly submit" to forfeiture every time
John Bennis drives away in her half-owned Pontiac? Perhaps, like any wise
business person, she should protect herself from such adverse consequences
by purchasing "unfaithful spouse insurance."
Even the more modem assumptions associated with in rem fictions ring
false when wedged into the family context. The Court in Calero-Toledo
attempted to sell the desirability of in rem forfeiture's harsh consequences as
visited on an innocent owner by arguing that -such confiscation would induce
owners "to exercise greater care in transferring possession of their property.""' As recently as 1993, the Court repeatedly echoed this prevention-ofnegligence rationale. 154 However, a wife cannot be expected to have the
same duties of caution toward her husband as does the property owner in a
business toward his patrons. A ship owner will interview his master, ask for
references, seek out personal histories and enter into indemnity contracts.
Likewise, a lessor can seek background details and purchase insurance. Such

152. Harmony v. United States, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 234 (1844).
153. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 688 (1974).
154. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 611 (1993) ("As Blackstone put it, 'such
misfortunes are in part owing to the negligence of the owner, and therefore he is properly
punished by such forfeiture.'"). Austin also offered that two of forfeiture's theories rest "at
bottom, on the notion that the owner has been negligent in allowing his property to be misused
and that he is properly punished for that negligence." Id. at 615. Further still, the Court alluded
to the owner negligence theory: "In none of these cases did the Court apply the guilty-property
fiction to justify forfeiture when the owner had done all that reasonably could be expected to
prevent the unlawful use of his property." Id. at 616.
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behavior is not only proper but expected of the cautious business person.
Lacking the formality of transfer typical of commercial ventures, families can
hardly be expected to take the same precautions. Nor would such conduct
among husband and wife be desirable. Such statements as, "Dear, before you
drive off, could you list three references?" would find their place in a
Broadway farce rather than in courtroom testimony. Thus, when the context
of the holdings quoted so assuredly by the Bennis Court is considered, these
rulings lose their rational force among family members in the 1990's.
C. Bennis' Distortion of History FurtherErodes Due ProcessRights
Chief Justice Rehnquist offered as an excuse for extending in rem
forfeiture to property transfers among family members that his hands had been
tied by "a long and unbroken line of cases."" s In other words, the most
powerful court in the land and the final tribunal for constitutional issues was
powerless against an ancient fabrication. Courts have been allowing the
government to confiscate property from innocents for so long that the very
practice of deference to forfeiture became its driving force. Thus, the force
of history, or at least the Court's skewed view of it, was offered as meager
support for an irrational result. 56
History's ever continuing extension of in rem forfeiture's intrusiveness
upon innocent owners reached new heights in Bennis. While the in rem label
has traditionally enabled the courts to circumvent the due process rights
guaranteed to persons, the Court's leading cases generally limited forfeiture's
negative effects to the commercial context. Now, with Bennis, the Court has
invaded the sphere of family life, threatening to compel spouses to keep their
mates at arm's length in order to preserve their fundamental protections of due
process.
V. A PROPOSAL TO SAVE DUE PROCESS FROM CURRENT FORFEITURE LAW
A solution to the due process problems created by Bennis does exist.
Preservation of Fourteenth Amendment values simply requires that the Court
refrain from selectively using precedent. Indeed, the true tragedy of the
Bennis holding is not that it provides the latest contraction of rights in a "long
and unbroken line of cases." Rather, the real failing of Bennis is that it

155. Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 998 (1996).
156. "It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down
in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down
have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past." Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
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represents a lurch backward from due process advances made by the Court
only three terms ago.
In 1993, the Court came down with three decisions limiting government's
forfeiture powers: Austin v. United States,"5 7 United States v. 92 Buena
Vista Avenue, 5 8 and United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property.5 9
In Austin, the Court held the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment
applies to certain statutory forfeitures." 6
Even more significant than
Austin's recognition of constitutional constraint upon forfeiture was its
rationale. Justice Blackmun, writing for the Austin Court, did not flinch in
acknowledging modem forfeiture's past. While the Court in Bennis based its
decision upon selective memory, Blackmun openly dealt with deodand.' 6'
Further, Justice Blackmun flatly recognized that in rem forfeiture's fictions
were "'developed primarily to expand the reach of the courts' which,
particularly in admiralty proceedings, might have lacked in personam
jurisdiction over the owner of the property." 62 As little as three years
before Bennis, the Court did not shrink from noticing the unique context and
special pragmatic concerns of in rem forfeiture.
Moreover, the Austin Court did not share the Bennis view that forfeiture
of an innocent owner's property is immune from constitutional challenge. The
Austin Court could find no case that "appl[ied] the guilty-property fiction to
justify forfeiture when the owner had done all that reasonably could be
expected to prevent the unlawful use of his property."163 In fact, Justice
Blackmun echoed Calero-Toledo'sconcern that forfeiture of a "truly innocent
owner's property would raise 'serious constitutional questions. ' "" Somehow, in three years, a time shorter than that needed for the Bennis case to
reach the Supreme Court, these "serious" issues were reduced to irrelevancies
not rating even a response on the merits. "
The Court made another inroad on government forfeiture in 92 Buena
Vista Avenue. This case dealt in part with the relationship between the innocent
owner defense and the "relation back" doctrine. " At common law, the

157. 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
158. 507 U.S. 111 (1993).
159. 510 U.S. 43 (1993).
160. Austin, 509 U.S. at 605.

161. Id. at 611-13.
162. Id. at 615 n.9 (quoting Republic Nat'l Bank v. United States, 506 U.S. 80, 87 (1992)).
163. Id. at 616.
164. Id. at 617 (quoting Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 689-90

(1974)).
165. The Bennis Court chose to avoid a discussion of the Austin decision's substantive
language, finding that, in Austin, "[there was no occasion... to deal with the validity of the
'innocent owner defense.'" Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1000.
166. See United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 507 U.S. 111, 123-29 (1993).
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relation back rule caused the title of forfeited property to be carried back to
the original commission of the offense in question. 67 Justice Stevens,
writing for the Court, decided this case largely on grounds of statutory
interpretation'68 and on the kind of property subject to forfeiture. 16 9 The
case is, however, significant for demonstrating that the Court was not afraid
to limit government action against innocent owners in in rem forfeiture cases.
Further, it identified the rights abridged by wrongful forfeiture as being of
historically fundamental importance., 70
Perhaps the most interesting of the trio of 1993 decisions is James Daniel
Good. This case may provide a guide for future in rem forfeitures. The
James Daniel Good Court held that, in the absence of exigent circumstances,
Fifth Amendment Due Process forbids government seizure of real property
without providing the owner with notice and an opportunity to be heard."'
Again, for our purposes, the most important aspect of this decision was not its
holding, but its rationale. Justice Kennedy, writing for the James Daniel Good
Court, was not afraid to probe precedent for the reasons behind rules. Justice

167. Id. at 125.
168. For example, Justice Stevens noted: "The text of the statute is the strongest support for
this conclusion." Id. at 123. A more detailed view of the Court's construction of the legislation
at issue, the Comprehensive Drug Abuse and Control Act of 1970, requires consideration of the
government's argument regarding the relation back doctrine and the factual setting of the case.
The 92 Buena Vista Avenue case dealt with the forfeiture of a house that respondent had
purchased using drug proceeds given to her by Joseph Brenna. Id. at 114. Respondent swore
no knowledge of the origins of the $240,000 she acquired from Brenna. Id. at 115. The federal
statute in question had a specific provision creating an innocent owner defense. The government's argument, however, would have effectively rendered this provision worthless. Justice
Stevens therefore reasoned:
The Government contends that the money that Brenna received in exchange for
narcotics became Government property at the moment Brenna received it and that
respondent's house became Government property when that tainted money was used
in its purchase. Because neither the money nor the house could have constituted
forfeitable proceeds until after an illegal transaction occurred, the Government's
submission would effectively eliminate the innocent owner defense in almost every
imaginable case in which proceeds could be forfeited. It seems unlikely that
Congress would create a meaningless defense.
Id. at 124.
169. Since this case focused on forfeiture of proceeds, the Court found it questionable whether
common law was even applicable. See id. at 125. Even if common law was controlling, Justice
Stevens determined that, due to procedural timing issues, the government's reliance upon the
relation back doctrine still did not block the respondent's use of the innocent owner defense. Id.
at 125-29.
170. The Court noted: "Laws providing for the official seizure and forfeiture of tangible
property used in criminal activity have played an important role in the history of our country..
. Indeed, the misuse of the hated general warrant is often cited as an important cause of the
American Revolution." Id. at 118-19 (footnote omitted).
171. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43 (1993).
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Kennedy was alert to the fact that much of the rules carried down through the
case law were inherited from revenue decisions, which were burdened with
their own peculiar problems. After all, the issue of revenue was one particular
urgency, for it directly affected government survival.'" Before the federal
income tax, almost three quarters of government's receipts came from taxes
on alcohol, customs, and tobacco." r Thus, immediate and severe forfeitures
to enforce revenue laws were deemed not only necessary but crucial to the
proper functioning of government.
The James Daniel Good Court was, however, able to recognize that
government interests evolve with the passing of time or the change of
circumstances. With the imposition of a federal income tax, the earlier
revenue urgencies no longer existed. 74 Therefore, the Court's ruling
allowing pre-hearing seizures was no longer proper. 75s Borrowing this
approach, the Court stated that the rule created in Calero-Toledo permitting
forfeiture of a yacht without prior notice or hearing made no sense when
dealing with real property.'7 6 Pre-hearing seizure made sense in a yacht
case because the property could be removed from the jurisdiction upon an
owner's receiving notice of a forfeiture hearing.'" Yet, the same rule was
unnecessary when the subject of seizure was real property, which, "by its very
nature, can be neither moved nor concealed."171
By simply recognizing the historical context of the cases and the reasons
for their rules, Justice Kennedy pursued a common sense approach to
forfeiture. If circumstances change so dramatically that the original purposes
of a rule are no longer served, then abandon the original formulation. In
1993, the James Daniel Good Court was able to accomplish this elementary
task. In 1996, the Bennis Court was not.
Following the cleared path of Austin, 92 Buena Vista Avenue and James
Daniel Good, the way out of the in rem forfeiture morass is to acknowledge
the change in times. The family Pontiac is not a pirate ship of the late 1700's,
nor is it a distillery in the early 1800's. The fear that distant owners would
escape accountability lacked any basis in Bennis, where the owners of the
family car lived and worked in Detroit, Michigan. The danger that an
innocent owner defense will bankrupt the government treasury is equally
groundless. Therefore, the fictions surrounding these ancient concerns (the

172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.

at 60.
at 60-61.
at 52-53.
at 52.
at 53.
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rules of proceeding against the property and not the owner and the property
itself having a culpable personality) should be abandoned in this case.
Once the ancient axioms are eliminated, courts will be free to recognize
the party whose rights are actually affected by government forfeiture, the
property owner. Rather than targeting "guilty cars," 179 courts will rationally
focus on the drivers and the complicity of owners. A natural outgrowth of
such a shift in perception will be the recognition of an innocent owner defense.
This common sense change is crucial for due process. Quite simply, innocent
people will be able to avoid the arbitrary loss of their property rights.
The stakes are particularly high in the domestic setting, where family
members are expected not only to trust but also to rely upon and love one
another. Citizens should be able to have faith both in their relatives and in the
strength of their property rights. Of course, when denied the device of pitting
spouses against each other in order to encourage private oversight as an aid to
enforcement of state law, the policing job will be harder. This merely means
that the government will have to do what it has always done in the criminal
justice system: rely on the efforts of its own personnel.
VI. CONCLUSION

When is the family car the constitutional equivalent of a pirate ship?
According to our Supreme Court, this change takes place when an unfaithful
husband chooses the car as the site of his indecent act with a prostitute.180
Bennis has determined that, like the vessels of nineteenth-century privateers,
a wife's Pontiac can be forfeited to the state despite her complete innocence
of any criminal activity. Since prostitutes have plied their trade in such
diverse venues as "palaces, luxury hotels, cruise ships, college dormitories,
truck stops, back alleys, and back seats," the scope of the Court's ruling is
enormous."' Yet, the reasoning supporting this monumental extension of
Perhaps Chief Justice
government forfeiture power is scant indeed.
Rehnquist, knowing that in rem forfeiture's history is that of a practice ever
in search of a rationale, simply chose to avoid an exercise in futility.
When Tina Bennis took her wedding vows, little could she have known
that her fate would be touched by rules designed to wring compensation from
pirates and bootleggers. Of course, committing to a life-long relationship is
fraught with the risks only decades can bring. Yet, certainly Tina Bennis did
not understand the magnitude of her gamble. Justice Thomas noted:
"Improperly used, forfeiture could become more like a roulette wheel
employed to raise revenue from innocent but hapless owners whose property

179. See J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 509 (1921).
180. Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 996, 998 (1996).
181. Id. at 1003 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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is unforeseeably misused, or a tool wielded to punish those who associate with
criminals, than a component of a system of justice. " "'8 Tina Bennis,
knowing nothing of the actions her husband was committing against the State
of Michigan and their nine years of marriage and losing her car due to her
husband's infidelity, may indeed feel that the legal system of this nation
behaves more like a roulette wheel than an instrument of due process.

182. Id. at 1003 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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